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R E L IG IO U S  AND CLASS V O T IN G  IN T H E  N E T H E R L A N D S 
1990-1991: A R E V IE W  O F R E C E N T  C O N T R IB U T IO N S T E ST E D
PEER SCHEEPERS, JAN LAM M ERS and JAN PETERS
In troduc tion
The Dutch pillarized political system up to the mid-sixties has been described 
as a consociational democracy with stable relations between political parties 
and their electorates (Lijphart, 1968). Voters were thought to vote on the basis 
of religion or social class for politicians representing their pillar's interests.
Dutch researchers seem to agree on the extent to which this system has 
eroded over the years in a process labelled de-alignment1. They state that 
traditional religion-related or class-related factors have lost their dominancy 
for political voting“. And indeed, recent empirical findings show, that a 
growing number of  people have left or are leaving the church (Peters, Felling 
and Scheepers, 1993; SCP, 1994) and that the association between both social 
class and religion with voting has decreased over the years (cf. Ultee, Flap 
and Arts, 1991 ; Eisinga, Felling and Lammers, 1994). Next, it is argued that 
new political cleavages and issues have become more important to explain 
voting behaviour. Van der Eijk and Niemoller suppose that ‘...another struc­
turing factor has emerged: left-right ideology...' (1987, 17). Van Deth and 
Geurts (1989, 17) emphasize the importance of new political priorities 
clustered in the concept of post-materialism derived from Inglehart ( 1977,
1990). Middendorp states that ideological stands and political attitudes have 
become crucial to understanding contemporary voting in the Netherlands. He 
summarizes the process that has taken place in the past decades as kthe 
ideologization of vote' ( 1991, 287).
The questions we would like to address in this study are related to these 
recent insights. Do social class and religion no longer directly affect political 
voting? Have the ‘old political issues' been replaced by these ‘new political 
issues'? And more specifically: to what extent are the effects of religious and 
class voting intermediated by political attitudes? These questions have only 
been addressed partially in recent studies. That is why we feel a more 
extensive synthesis of hypotheses on these issues is called for.
6Theories on voting
In virtually all the previous research, theoretical models were postulated in 
which the effects of social class and religion on voting are considered to be 
intermediated by political attitudes. Virtually all the studies conclude that 
political attitudes are more important to explain voting than social class and 
religion. That is why we will start with the relations between political 
attitudes and voting, followed by the relations between social positions and 
political attitudes.
Political attitudes and voting
One of the classic studies on political attitudes is the one by Lipset (1981). 
He focussed on two political attitudes, economic liberalism and cultural 
conservatism. He described economic liberalism as a complex of  consistent 
political opinions regarding a more equal distribution of income, status and 
power and regarding governmental intervention to establish this distribution. 
And he described cultural conservatism as a complex of consistent political 
opinions regarding the restriction of civil liberties and regarding pro-nation- 
alistic and anti-internationalistic governmental policies. Lipset suggested that 
these political attitudes were important for voting. His explanation of voting 
may be summarized by the notion that voters take political stands in line with 
their interests and consequently vote for political parties that claim to take 
the same stands on these issues and thus serve the interests of these particular 
voters.
This theory has been replicated (at least partially) many times. But very 
few researchers (like Middendorp, 1978, 1989, 19913; Felling and Peters, 
1986; Lammers and Peters, 1988) have tested the extent to which these two 
political attitudes affect political voting in the Netherlands. This evidence 
indicates that these political attitudes, referring to political issues that are still 
of  contemporary concern, do affect political voting. Adapting Lipset 's theory 
to the Dutch context, it is plausible to hypothesize that:
1 adherence to economic liberalism might lead one to vote for left-wing 
parties that claim to redistribute scarce socio-economic resources more 
equally
2 adherence to cultural conservatism might lead one to vote for right-wing 
parties that claim to preserve traditional cultural norms and values.
In some of the recent studies on voting in the Netherlands, these political 
attitudes have been neglected4, probably on the assumption that these stands 
have lost their relevance. These studies focus on other factors thought to 
affect political voting like post-materialism and/or left-right placement.
The importance of post-materialism as a factor affecting political voting
#7
has been strongly emphasized by Van Deth (1984; Van Deth and Geurts, 
1989). The idea behind this approach is that some old political issues have 
gradually lost their relevance, partly due to the fact that ‘...post-war gener­
ations in particular tend to emphasize self-fulfilment, independence and 
emancipation... '  (Van Deth and Geurts, 1989, 17), paying more attention to 
the environment and the quality of life and paying less attention to material 
matters that are taken for granted. This ‘new ideology' has generally been 
labelled post-materialism, following Inglehart (1977, 1990). People who 
subscribe to these political ideas feel that social change is necessary to realize 
these postmaterial goals and hence vote for political parties on the left that 
advocate such radical societal changes. The hypothesis derivable from this 
approach may be summarized as:
3 adherence to post-materialism may lead one to vote for political parties on 
the (far) left that claim to promote radical societal changes.
Next, especially Niemoller and Van der Eijk have promoted left-right place­
ment as a decisive factor regarding voting, ‘...which accounts for a great deal 
o f  voter behaviour, party behaviour and issue formation...’ (1986, 17). The 
idea behind this firm statement is that voters place themselves on an abstract 
continuum ranging from far left to far right and then decide to vote for a party 
they perceive as being close to this left-right position. That is why this notion 
is known as kthe smallest distance hypothesis’. This approach has been 
severely criticized for its lack of a clear substantial meaning attributable to 
the abstract continuum (cf. Middendorp, 1989), for its lack of predictive 
power (Van Holsteyn, 1989; Maas et al., 1991), and for its lack of theoretical 
relevance and for its triviality (Van Deth and de Graaf, 1991; Schmeets and 
Molin, 1992). But there is empirical evidence that this factor is significant in 
predicting voting. The hypothesis derivable from this approach, previously 
summarized by Van Deth (1986), is simply:
4 self-placement on the left-right dimension affects political voting, i.e. 
people on the left side of the continuum vote for left-wing parties and 
people on the right side vote for right-wing parties.
Now that we have distinghuished four hypotheses on the direct effects of 
political attitudes on political voting, the question arises as to how political 
attitudes are related to social positions that are also considered significant for 
voting.
Social positions and political attitudes
There appears to be some consensus on the effects of social positions on 
political attitudes.
Previous research on economic liberalism has shown that social class is 
important, even after controlling for educational level and other predictors
8considered significant (cf. Scheepers et al., 1992). It appeared that the 
working class favours economic liberalism, which is explained in line with 
Lipset by the notion that its economic interests would be served and its social 
position would be improved by a policy implementing these political ideas. 
Hence, from previous research it follows that:
5 economic liberalism is strongly subscribed to by the working class. 
Previous researchers were somewhat puzzled by the fairly consistent finding 
that the working class also subscribes to cultural conservatism (for over­
views: De Witte, 1990: Scheepers et al., 1992). It was considered paradoxical 
that the working class was liberal on economic issues and simultaneously 
conservative on cultural matters, regarding issues like civil liberties, but also 
regarding traditional sex roles, abortion and euthanasia. In these studies, it 
was not taken into account that at least part of the working class was and still 
is religious (cf. Felling et al., 1986), meaning that they might also be true to 
the norms and values propagated by religiously oriented institutions. Hence, 
the finding that the working class subscribes to cultural conservatism might 
be partially due to its religious background. This might also apply to the class 
of self-employed persons and farmers that have also been shown to subscribe 
to cultural conservatism ( c f  Scheepers et al., 1992): these political attitudes 
might also be due to their religious background, as might more generally hold 
true for religious segments of other social classes. This may be explained in 
line with Lipset by the notion that the cultural interests o f  religious people 
would be served by maintaining these traditional norms which are strongly 
associated with their world views. From these insights may be derived that:
6 cultural conservatism is strongly subscribed to by the religious working 
class (6a) but also by the class of religious self-employed persons (6b).
Taking into account our previously postulated hypotheses on economic 
liberalism and cultural conservatism, we suspect that religious people belong­
ing to the working class might find themselves in a particularly nasty position, 
i.e. under cross-pressures (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1944). On the 
one hand, it is in their economic interest to subscribe to economic liberalism 
and hence vote for a left-wing party. On the other hand, it is in their cultural 
interest to be loyal to religiously inspired norms and values, i.e. subscribe to 
cultural conservatism, and hence vote for a party that claims to preserve these 
norms and values, which in the Dutch context would lead them to vote for a 
more confessional party. In order to see how they resolve these cross-press­
ures, one would need to conduct research on the effects of belonging to the 
working class and simultaneously belonging to some denomination. More in 
general, we consider it more in line with the findings and conclusions put 
forward by Lijphart (1968, 1974) to specify the effects of belonging to a social 
class on voting combined with the effects of belonging to a denomination. 
Next, belonging to a specific generation (as indicated by age) and educa­
tional level appear to contribute to the explanation of post-materialisnr (Van 
Deth and Geurts, 1989). The finding that post-materialism is especially 
prevalent among the younger generations is explained by the theory that they 
grew up in conditions where material scarcity was no longer prevalent, 
leading them to devote more attention to post-materialistic options. The effect 
o f  education was interpreted by the notion that highly educated people put 
less emphasis on material matters. These ideas lead us, in line with previous 
research, to hypothesize that:
7 post-materialism is affected by age (7a) and by educational level (7b). 
Empirical evidence regarding left-right placement has shown that social 
class, religion, educational level, and income6 contribute to the explanation 
of this dimension (cf. Niemoller and Van der Eijk, 1986; Middendorp, 1989,
1991). If we elaborate further on the argument on the cross-pressures de­
veloped for hypothesis 6, we would suggest, however, less straightforward 
hypotheses. Like in hypothesis 6, we would expect divergent left-right 
placements within at least some social classes according to religion: we would 
expect the religious working class to perceive itself as more right-wing and 
the non-religious working class as more left-wing. Derivable hypotheses are:
8 left-right placement is affected by social class in combination with religion 
(8a), by educational level (8b) and by income level (8c).
Now, we are left with some problems related to specific causal relations 
between political attitudes. When people decide on their political vote, they 
can be assumed to take all four stands into account to some extent. Van Deth 
and Geurts (1989) describe this as the complement hypothesis: several 
political motives contribute to the eventual decision to vote for one particular 
party. By contrast. Van der Eijk and Niemoller (1987) subscribe to the 
rejection hypothesis according to Van Deth and Geurts (1989): Van der Eijk 
and Niemoller state for instance that post-materialism does not contribute to 
the explanation of voting, once left-right placement has been controlled for. 
But there are valid grounds to specify the causal relations between the 
(intermediate) political attitudes by means of the interpretation hypothesis 
that assumes that left-right placement may interpret the link between political 
attitudes on the one hand and voting on the other. Van Deth and Geurts (1989) 
have empirically shown that left-right placement, regarded as the interpreta­
tive link between post-materialism and voting, results in the best fitting 
(LISREL) model. The implication of  these studies is that left-right placement 
is considered to be the result o f  preceding political attitudes, interpreting the 
relationship between political attitudes and voting. Taking this empirical 
evidence into account, we hypothesize that:
9 left-right placement is induced by political attitudes: economic liberalism 
(9a), cultural conservatism (9b) and post-materialism (9c).
Next, there appear to be inconsistent findings on whether social positions,
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like social class and religion, (still) have direct effects on voting. Niemoller 
and Van der Hijk (1986) first found these effects to he insignificant. But in a 
later study they found a direct effect of religion on voting (Van der Ei jk and 
Niemoller, 1987). Van Deth and Geurts (1989) assumed and found that the 
direct effects of social positions are insignificant: they concluded that social 
positions are only related to voting via post-materialism. On the other hand, 
Middendorp (1989, 1991) and Schmeets and Molin (1992) found that the 
direct effects of social class and religion are moderate, yet significant. These 
inconsistencies may be due to the fact that previous studies merely tested 
partial voting models, i.e. models in which some predictors of voting were 
not included. In this study, we have tried to incorporate all the factors 
considered theoretically relevant and statistically significant to explain voting 
in the nineties in the Netherlands7. Hence, if we find that the effects of  (the 
combination of) social class and religion on votins, not of all other knew' 
predictors, have become indirect, then the process of dealignment has reached 
its end and the process of the ideologization of  voting (Middendorp, 1991) is 
at stake. But if the direct effects of  (the combination of) social class and 
religion are still present, they may be interpreted as relics of the pillarized 
political system. Related to our central question and to put it sharply, we 
hypothesize that these direct effects are non-significant:
10 social positions, like social class (10a) and religion ( 10b) do not affect 
voting directly, separately nor in combination; instead the effects of 
social class and religion are fully mediated by political attitudes.
Finally we are left with some matters related to the specific causal relations 
between social positions. Social positions are obviously intertwined in social 
reality. This social fact is usually conceptualized by status-attainment 
models, in which income and social class are dependent on educational level 
(and age). However, this specification is not important for the questions 
addressed in this study: a status-attainment specification does not affect the 
estimates related to social class and/or religion on voting. For the sake of 
simplicity, we conceptualize the relations between the social positions as 
being associated, hence without specifying causal relationships between 
them. This leaves the possibility to specify interactive effects between social 
class and religion on intermediate and dependent variables. We will set out 
to test these synthesized hypotheses below.
Data
Data were derived from a national survey, entitled ‘Social and Cultural 
Developments in the Netherlands 1990'. For this survey, a two-stage random 
sample of the Dutch population was constructed. In the first stage, a number 
of municipalities was selected in such a way that the distribution of respond­
#ents over regions as well as over the degrees of urbanization would be 
represented proportionately to the national distribution. In the second stage, 
people aged 18 to 69 were randomly selected from the registers of the 
municipalities previously selected. This sample (N=2384) turned out to be 
representative of  the Dutch population regarding sex, age, and marital status 
(cf. Eisinga, Felling, Peters, Scheepers and Schreuder, 1992).
M easurem en ts
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Let us first turn to the operationalization of independent variables in the 
model.
Social class was constructed using the operationalization designed by 
Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1983) for comparative purposes (cf. 
Ganzeboom, Treiman and Luijkx, 1989). Originally it consisted of ten 
nominal categories that, for reasons of surveyability, were reduced to five 
categories, more or less in line with the recommendation made by the original 
constructors. Each category contains a sufficient number of respondents for 
statistical analyses. This operationalization was developed to identify each 
respondent’s objective class position based on a number of criteria. Hence, 
it is different from the operationalizations used in previous studies on voting 
where subjective class identification was used (cf. Niemoller and Van der 
Eijk, 1986; Van der Eijk and Niemoller, 1987; Middendorp, 1989, 1991). 
However, we executed an extra analysis with the subjective class identifica­
tion as independent variable in order to ascertain the extent to which substan­
tially different results appeared.
Religion was measured according to a typology derived from Felling et al. 
(1991), referred to as church involvement. It is based on questions on church 
membership, and attendance and participation in church activities. Felling et 
al. distinguished six categories of church involvement. But we had to reduce 
this number of categories severely because we suspected an interaction effect 
of social class with religion. To specify this interaction, we would need to 
include an unsurveyable number of nominal categories and end up with an 
equally unsurveyable number of parameters. Hence this extensive typology 
was reduced to two categories. The first category contains non-members: 
people from a second generation of non-members, a first generation of 
non-members and former members. The second category contains members: 
marginal, modal and core members.
Education was measured by the highest educational level the respondents 
completed. This variable has seven categories considered metric, varying 
from primary school to university.
Income was measured by the monthly income after taxes of the household
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the respondent belonged to, with six categories considered metric. Age was 
ascertained by the respondent's  year of  birth.
Now let us turn to the operationalization of the intermediate variables in the 
model.
To cover economic liberalism, three measurements were used, highly 
similar to previous studies (Felling and Peters, 1986; Lammers and Peters, 
1988). The first refers to items on the desirability of  reducing status and 
income inequalities, constructed by means of  probabilistic scalogram ana­
lysis (H=.52, rho=.72). There is further one additive scale dealing with items 
on the desirability of  tougher trade union policies (Cronbach 's  alpha=.49), 
and one item on the desirability of government intervention to reduce income 
inequalities.
To cover cultural conservatism, we used three scales used in previous 
research (Felling and Peters, 1986; Lammers and Peters, 1988) but slightly 
different than in a more recent study (Scheepers et al., 1992) where Lipset 's 
conceptualization was conscientiously followed. The first scale has six items 
on a traditional view of women (Cronbach's a lpha= .71). The second contains 
six items on the restriction of civil liberties, constructed by means of prob­
abilistic scalogram analysis (H=.47, rho=.75). The third deals with the 
acceptability of human intervention in matters of life and death, i.e. abortion, 
suicide and euthanasia, constructed by means of probabilistic scalogram 
analysis (H = .51, rho= .7 1).
Economic liberalism and cultural conservatism repeatedly appeared to 
constitute two separate highly consistent scales that are statistically inde­
pendent (Scheepers et al., 1992). By means of factor analysis, for each scale 
factor scores were calculated that are usable for further analysis. These 
dimensions show a substantial overlap with two dimensions previously 
distinguished by Middendorp (1978, 1991), who operationalized these 
dimensions more elaborately. He referred to economic liberalism as socio­
economic left-right, and to cultural conservatism as libertarianism-authorita- 
rianism. For the sake of  simplicity we will continue to use the terms economic 
liberalism and cultural conservatism that we perceive of  as expressing more 
directly their substantial content.
Post-materialism was measured with four items described as political 
goals, derived from the original study by Inglehart (1977). Two of them refer 
to the materialistic dimension, the other two to the post-materialistic dimen­
sion. Respondents were requested to rank order these items. With this 
measurement, a typology was constructed containing: pure materialists, pure 
post-materialists and a mixed type of materialists and post-materialists. 
Although this typology is based on fewer items than used by previous
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researchers (van Eijk and Niemoller, 1987; Van Deth and Geurts, 1989), it
contains the same substantial categories.
And the last of the intermediate variables, left-right self-placement, was 
ascertained by the straightforward measurement of the respondents’ self­
placement on a ten-point scale ranging from left (1) to right (10).
Lastly, let us turn to the dependent variable of  intended voting.
This variable is quite complex in the Netherlands because of the large 
number of political parties with a wide range of ideological stances. Because 
this variable is obviously of  a nominal measurement level, it is often turned 
into a metric variable in order to use it in multivariate regression analyses 
where metricity is one of the assumptions. Van der Eijk and Niemoller ( 1983, 
1987; Niemoller and Van der Eijk, 1986) used the mean rating on the left-right 
scale to rank order political parties on a one-dimensional metric continuum. 
Much the same procedure was followed by others (Middendorp, 1989; 
Hendriks Vettehen, 1990; Schmeets and Molin, 1992) as well as by Van Deth 
and Geurts (1989), who used an extended version of this type of procedure. 
But this research problem has not yet been approached by means of a more 
appropriate procedure that does not assume metricity like logistic regression, 
probably due to the difficulties that arise with the interpretation of the 
parameters. Recently a procedure to overcome such difficulties has been 
introduced: regression analysis with nominal variables (RENOVA: cf. Lam- 
mers and Pelzer, 1991, 1992). We will describe some of the possiblities of 
this programme in the next section.
Analyses
We used RENOVA to test our hypotheses. This statistical programme pro­
vides possibilities to explore and estimate the causal relations between 
exogeneous, intermediate and endogeneous variables just like conventional 
multiple regression analysis. And just like in conventional regression ana­
lysis, nominal predictors can be included as dummy variables and entered in 
equations next to metric predictors. The main difference with conventional 
regression analysis is that nominal dependent variables may also be included 
in RENOVA.
Prior to the analysis, all the metric variables were standardized in order to 
transform their general mean to zero and their standard deviation to one. 
Social class and religion were combined into ten categories for the combina­
tion of objective social class with religion (see Table 1) and into eight 
categories for the combination of subjective social class with religion (see 
Table 2). Next we specified two recursive models: one containing the 
objective social class position combined with religion, and one containing
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the subjective class identification combined with religion8. Finally, we con­
secutively eliminated the predictors with the lowest non-significant t-value 
from each of  these models in order to obtain more accurate estimates of the 
parameters of the restricted models.
Let us first explain the interpretation of the parameters presented in Tables
1 and 2 in general before we give the results of the analyses in greater detail 
(cf. Lammers and Pelzer, 1991, 1992). All the figures in the tables are 
multiple regression effects and have hence been controlled for other predic­
tors in the equations. The effects in each column have been derived from one 
regression equation for the dependent variable mentioned at the top of that 
column. The last six columns pertain to party preferences. The first cells of 
these columns contain the intercepts that reflect the percentages of people 
who vote for a particular party. They are the same in both tables and serve as 
references in interpreting the parameters in the column cells. For instance, 
the effect o f  belonging to the religious working class (RWC) on voting for 
the Labour Party (-5.72 in Table 1) means that the percentage of  voters for 
the Labour Party is 5.72% lower in this category than the general percentage 
of  25.46%. Or to put it in terms of probability: belonging to the religious 
working class decreases the probability of voting for the Labour Party by 
.0572 from the general probability of .2546. For the interpretation of an effect 
of a metric predictor on the voting alternatives, no reference to the general 
percentage is needed. For instance, the effect of education of -6.20 in the 
same column means that an increase of one unit on the standardized variable 
of education decreases the percentage of voters for the Labour Party by 6.20% 
or the probability to vote for this party by .0620. The effects in the first four 
columns of the tables pertain to metric standardized dependent variables and 
should be interpreted according to the status of the predictor variable, whether 
nominal or metric. The effect of belonging to the religious working class on 
cultural conservatism (.44) represents the difference of predicted scores on 
this standardized variable between somebody who belongs to the religious 
working class and somebody who does not. And the effect of -.21 of the 
metric variable education refers to the difference in predicted score on 
cultural conservatism by changing one unit on the standardized scale of 
education. The interpretation of the latter effect (of a standardized predictor 
on a standardized dependent) is similar to the normal standardized regression 
effect. Now let us turn to the results of the analyses in greater detail.
Results
The results of the analyses are presented in Table 1 (with categories o f  the 
objective social class position and religion) and Table 2 (with categories of
Dc pen 
dents
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Table I RENOVA parameter estimates of the restricted regression model with interaction 
effects of social class (based on objective criteria) with religion (n=1600), only significant 
parameters included (pc.05)
Independents:
ECLI CULC PMT LERI GRL PVDA D'66 CDA VVD KLR
GM 6.87 25.46 19.72 31.85 12.97 3.14
RWC .44 -.17 11 •  r nmm m m -5.72 -5.78 20.41 -7.17
NRWC .19 -.16 -.13 5.94 9.25 -13.29 -2.52
RSE -.52 .42 .29 23.22
NRSE -.36 -17.52 19.39
RNM .19 .13 -5.15 16.13 -7.08
NRNM .13 -.30 -.15 10.22 -13.48
RLM .34 .20 -7.50 9.63 -4.73 5.03
NRLM -.49 .34 -.27 4.02 -10.76
R H M -.51 .36 -13.06 13.24
NRHM -.31 -.27 -18.55 16.24
EDU -.21 .19 -6.20 3.51
INC -.17 -.08 .10 -2.15
AGE .12 -.12 -1.45 2.09 -1.50
ECLI -.30 1.70 6.56 -6.96
CULC .26 -2.74 -5.74 3.16 -2.51 6.23
PM AT -.1 1 2.04 1.11
LERI -4.94 -15.32 12.19 8.81 .94
adj. R2 8.27 24.40 10.64 30.84 13.19 22.86 8.30 26.52 19.26 14.43
Abbreviations:
GM = general mean GRL = Green Party
•
RWC = religious working classc c PVDA = Labour PartvJ
NRWC = non-religious working class D'66 -  Social Liberals
RSE = religious self-employed people CDA = Christian Democrats
NRSE = non-religious self-employed people VVD = Classic Liberals
RNM = religious non-manuals KLR = small confessional parties
NRNM = non-religious non-manualsc
RLM = religious lower managers
NRLM = non-relieious lower managers
RHM = religious higher managersU C C-
NRHM = non-religious higher managersc c
EDU = highest level of education
INC = monthly income
AGE = age
ECLI = economic liberalism
CULC = cultural conservatism
PMT = post-materialism
LERI = left-right self-placement
adj. R2 = adjusted amount of explained variance
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the subjective class identification and religion). We will only pay attention 
to significant effects in these tables.
Hypothesis 1 claims that subscribing to economic liberalism leads people to 
vote for left-wing parties that want to redistribute scarce socio-economic 
resources more equally. Table 1 shows that the stronger one subscribes to 
economic liberalism, the greater the chance is o f  voting for the Green Party 
(1.70) or for the Labour Party (6.56), which means that hypothesis 1 is not 
refuted.
Hypothesis 2, claiming that cultural conservatism leads people to vote for 
right-wing parties, is also not refuted: it appears that the stronger one 
subscribes to cultural conservatism, the greater one ’s chance is of voting forc  cr
the Christian Democrats (3.16) or for the small confessional parties (6,23). 
But subscribing to cultural conservatism does not increase one 's  chance of 
voting for the Classic Liberals.c
Hypothesis 3, claiming that subscribing to post-materialism leads one to 
vote for radical left-wing parties is also not refuted: the more one adheres to 
post-materialism, the greater one 's  chance of  voting for the Green Party 
(2.04). But post-materialism leads other people to vote for right-wing parties,
i.e. the small confessional parties. We will try to explain this rather unusual 
finding below.
Hypothesis 4, claiming that left-right placement is a decisive factor leading 
people who place themselves on the left end of the continuum to vote for 
left-wing parties and people who place themselves on the right end of the 
continuum to vote for right-wing parties, is not refuted. All the parameters 
have the right sign. Yet, we find some irregularities. After controlling for 
other relevant predictors, an extreme left-wing self-placement increases 
one 's  chance of  voting for the Labour Party whereas a less extreme left-wing 
placement increases one 's  chance of voting for the Green Party, and it appears 
that an extreme right-wing self-placement increases one’s chance of voting 
for the Christian Democrats, whereas a less extreme right-wing self-place­
ment increases one 's  chance of voting for the small confessional parties.
Hypothesis 5, claiming that economic liberalism is strongly subscribed to 
by the working class, is partially refuted because this only holds true for the 
non-religious working class (with a coefficient of .19); the religious working 
class does not differ significantly from the general mean, controlling for other 
relevant factors.
Hypothesis 6a is not refuted because the religious working class strongly 
subscribes to cultural conservatism (.44) whereas the non-religious working 
class rejects this complex of political opinions (-.16). This also applies to 
hypothesis 6b: religious self-employed people subscribe significantly more 
to cultural conservatism (.42) but non-religious self-employed people do not
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differ from the general mean. Moreover, this pattern repeats itself within each 
social class: religious people subscribe to cultural conservatism irrespective 
of  their social class.
Hypothesis 7a, claiming that younger generations, as indicated by age, arc 
more inclined to post-materialism (-.12), is not refuted. This also applies to 
hypothesis 7b, claiming that the inclination to subscribe to post-materialism 
increases with the level of education (.19).
Hypothesis 8a. claiming that left-right placement is affected directly by a 
combination of social class and religion, is not refuted: in virtually all the 
social classes, people belonging to the religious sub-category view them­
selves as being more right-wing (indicated by a positive parameter) whereas 
people belonging to the non-religious category view themselves as being 
more left-wing (indicated by a negative parameter). Hypothesis 8b, claiming 
that left-right placement is induced directly by educational level is refuted by 
the fact that this parameter does not reach significance. And hypothesis 8c, 
claiming that the higher one 's  income, the more inclined one is to place 
oneself at the right end of the continuum, appears to be not refuted (. 10).
Hypothesis 9a, 9b and 9c are not refuted because left-right placement is 
directly induced by economic liberalism (-.30), cultural conservatism (.26) 
and post-materialism (-.1 1).
Finally we turn to the last hypotheses, claiming that voting is not or is no 
longer directly affected by (a combination of) social class and religion. 
Having included all the political attitudes that were considered theoretically 
relevant and statistically significant in previous research, we might interpret 
the direct effects of the combination of social class and religion on voting as 
traditional pillar voting, i.e. voting for the political party that is thought to 
serve one 's  economic or cultural interests best. Such traditional voting stillcr
existed in the Netherlands in the winter of 1990-1991, and fairly predictably 
so, one might conclude.
First, it appeared that participating in a religion, regardless o f  one 's  social 
class, increased the chance that one would vote for a religious party and 
decreased the chance that one would vote for any non-religious party. Second, 
within the category of non-religious voters there appeared to be a wide variety 
of  political preferences, but there were also still some ‘old' regularities. For 
instance, belonging to the working class appeared to increase the chance of 
voting for the Labour Party, but also for the Social Liberals (D'66). And 
belonging to the class o f  self-employed people or belonging to the class of 
higher managers increased the chance of voting for the Classic Liberals 
(VVD). Between these extremes, we found some variety in voting: belonging 
to the routine non-manuals increased the chance of voting for the Social 
Liberals and belonging to the lower managers increased the chance of votingcr o o
for the Green Party.
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Depen
dents
Table 2 RENOVA parameter estimates of the restricted regression model with interaction 
effects of social class (based on subjective criteria) with religion (n=1689), only significant 
parameters included (p<.05)
Independents:
%
ECLI CULC PMT LERI GRL PVDA D'66 CDA VVD KLR
GM 6.87 25.46 19.72 31.85 12.97 3.14
RWC .53 -.27 -8.93 12.20 -7.84
NRWC .38 -.25 -.26 17.36 -17.02
RLM .31 .29 -6.39 -7.23 20.19 -8.63
NRLM -.20 .10 -.13 -2.74 12.88 -13.33 3.64 -2.02
RUM -.28 .28 .17 -5.50 -5.58 16.05 -5.33
NRUM -.35 .13 -.12 4.36 -13.06 7.31
RUC -.69 .41 5.63
NRUC -.31 -.35 -1 1.06 12.45
EDU -.23 9? •  « * ■ » -4.04 2.37
INC -.10 -.07 .06 -1.95
AGE .13 -.12 -1.37 -1.24
ECLI -.31 1.87 5.44 -7.22
CULC .27 -2.86 -5.73 3.13 -2.18 6.32
PMAT -.12 2.23 1.32
LERI -4.76 -15.93 1 1.80 8.88
adj. R2 6.86 24.00 10.25 31.31 13.06 25.45 8.50 26.91 18.89 13.97
Abbreviations:
GM = neneral mean GRL = Green Party
RWC = religious working class PVDA = Labour Party
NRWC = non-religious working class D '66 = Social Liberals
RLM = religious lower middle class CDA = Christian Democrats
NRLM = non-relisious lower middle class VVD = Classic Liberals
RUM = religious upper middle class KLR = small confessional parties
N R U M = non-religious upper middle class
RUC = religious upper class
NRUC = non-religious upper class
EDU = highest level of education
INC = monthly income
AGE = age
ECLI = economic liberalism
CULC = cultural conservatism
PMT = post-materialism
LERI = left-right self-placement
adj. R2 = adjusted amount of explained variance
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These findings can he supported by a different operationalization of social 
class. That is why we turn to Table 2, containing the analysis with subjective 
class identification, i.e. the operationalization of social class frequently used 
in this line of research.
We will only mention the results that differ substantially from the ones 
described above in Table 1. It appeared that, net o f  the effects of other relevant 
predictors, there are still direct effects of the combination of social class and 
religion: participating in a religion, regardless of one 's  social class, increased 
the chance of  voting for a religious party and decreased the chance of voting 
for any non-religious party. Within the category of non-religious people, we 
found that perceiving oneself as belonging to the working class increased the 
chance of voting for the Labour Party; and perceiving oneself as belonging 
to the upper class increased the chance of  voting for the Classic Liberals. 
Between these extremes, we found some variety. People who felt they 
belonged to the lower or upper middle class appeared to have greater chances 
of voting for the Social Liberals or for the Classic Liberals.
Although we have not specified any hypotheses on the effects of the cross­
pressures in the religious working class, we would like to pay some attention 
to this matter. We ascertained that belonging to the religious working class 
increased the chance of voting for the Christian Democrats and decreased the 
chance of voting for any non-religious party. This voting behaviour may be 
interpreted by the political attitudes of  this specific category (see Table 1). 
The religious working class appears to subscribe strongly to cultural conser­
vatism and views itself as being right-wing, whereas they do not differ from 
the general mean regarding economic liberalism and they reject post-materi­
alism. Hence, it may be concluded that the cross-pressures we suspected do 
not exist strongly in this category, since the religious working class does not 
subscribe to the political attitudes that might increase the chance of voting 
for a more left-wing party, according to the non-refuted hypotheses 3 and 5. 
Yet, there is another possibility, i.e. that the people in this category who do 
subscribe to economic liberalism and post-materialism as well as to cultural 
conservatism delay their political choices or refrain from voting, as was 
initially suspected by Lazarsfeld et al. (1944). But this possibility can not be 
tested within the scope of this study.
In the final section we will summarize the most important results from the 
perspective of the central questions stated in the introduction.
Conclusions and discussion
We started our study with the provocative theses formulated in recent studies
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that social class and religion, or more in general that class-related matters as 
well as religion-related matters had become irrelevant and insignificant for 
the explanation of  political voting. But our results indicate that these assum p­
tions are quite premature, as will be elaborately explained.
In order to test these theses, we developed a number of explicit hypotheses 
on the relations between social positions (i.e. combinations of  social class 
and religion next to age, educational level and income), political attitudes (i.e. 
economic liberalism, cultural conservatism, post-materialism and left-right 
self-placement) and voting. These hypotheses were derived from crucial 
theoretical insights as well as from empirical findings. The resulting hypo­
theses may be synthesized in an interpretation model: the association between 
social positions and voting are intermediated by political attitudes. It was 
argued that i f  this model showed that the relations between social positions 
and voting had become indirect, then the process of  de-alignment had 
approached its end and the process o f  ideologization was at stake.
We found that the combination of social class and religion still explained 
much of the voting behaviour of  the Dutch in the beginning o f  the nineties,C* C? CT
net of the most crucial political attitudes, whether old or new ones. First, it 
appeared that participating in a religion, irrespective o f  one 's  social class and 
net o f  political attitudes, increased the chance o f  voting for a religious party 
and decreased the chance of voting for any o f  the non-religious parties. 
Second, for non-religious people, it appeared that belonging to the working 
class increased the chance of  voting for the Labour Party whereas belonging 
to the middle or upper classes increased the chance of  voting for the Classic 
Liberals.
It may be argued that this voting pattern resembles the situation previously 
described by Lijphart (1974) to some extent. Hence, the hypothesis that the 
process of de-alignment had approached its end by the beginning o f  the 
nineties, may be rejected. And our data show, concerning the process of  
ideologization, that this process is on its way but is by no means completed. 
We predominantly observed ‘old' and well-known voting patterns. Rela­
tively new are the findings that belonging to the non-religious working class 
increased the chance of voting for the Social Liberals. This also held true for 
the non-religious class of  non-manuals, which is not really ‘new '.  Nor is it 
‘new' that belonging to the non-religious class o f  lower managers increased 
the chance of  voting for the Green Party. O f  course we also found voting 
patterns that deviate from the ones described, but they turned out to be 
statistically non-significant.
Having emphasized the importance of  the ‘old' cleavages, let us turn to the 
religion-related and class-related matters. We explained that subscribing to 
economic liberalism is in line with the economic interests of  the working 
class, which is why at least the non-religious working class votes for left-wing
#21
parties. And we explained that cultural conservatism is in line with the 
cultural interests of  religious people which is why they vote for religious 
parties. These ‘old' political attitudes appeared to be still important predictors 
of  voting, more important than post-materialism. This empirical evidence 
implies that the impact of  post-materialism as a ‘new political them e’ is quite 
marginal, however popular it seems to be among highly educated and among 
younger people. Post-materialism also seems to be popular in the class of 
non-religious lower managers, that might be considered the ‘New Class’ 
referred to by Inglchart (1981) as the carriers of  this new ideology. Post-ma­
terialism appeared to increase the chance o f  voting for the Green Party, but 
surprisingly also increased the chance of  voting for the small confessional 
parties. The latter effect may be explained by the age effect present in these 
parties: there appears to be an influx of young voters.
Left-right self-placement appeared to be strongly induced by economic 
liberalism, cultural conservatism and less so by post-materialism. Its effect 
on voting is statistically significant. We have to emphasize, however, that we 
concur with the critical theoretical and empirical remarks on this concept 
made in previous studies.
We would like to make some methodological remarks. In this line of  Dutch 
research, voting models have been developed incorporating the political 
parties as metric variables, which is open to methodological criticism. This 
may be the reason why researchers have put forward quite inconsistent 
findings regarding the effects of  social class and religion on voting. At any 
rate, it now turns out that they have somewhat underestimated the effects of 
social class and religion. This may also be due to the neglect of the fact that 
the interactive effect of  social class and religion contributes to the explanation 
of  voting. Applying more appropriate procedures has turned out to reveal that 
the more traditional voting patterns were still in existence at the beginning of 
the nineties.
In concluding, we would like to speculate somewhat on the extent to which 
these voting patterns will remain stable. Opinion polls show that both the 
Labour Party and the Christian Democrats will lose many of their voters in 
the coming national elections (May 1994). This seems to be mainly due to 
the policies on social security. Apparently, many former Labour voters, i.e. 
the non-religious working class, felt that these policies were not in line with 
the traditional views of economic liberalism. Many of these traditional 
Labour voters might (have) turn(ed) to the Social Liberals. Our data show 
that this tendency had already started in the winter of 1990-1991. Other 
traditional Labour voters may (have) turn(ed) to the extreme right-wing party 
(the Centrum Democraten): it was shown that belonging to the working class 
also increased the chance of voting for this party (Scheepers, Eisinga and 
Lammers, 1993). This tendency was already present by the end of  the
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eighties. But being religious decreased the chance of  voting for this party. If 
these tendencies hold true, is seems improbable that former voters for the 
Christian Democrats will turn to the extreme right-wing party. Then the 
question remains of which political parties these voters will turn to. Conside­
ring these de-alignments, the electoral landscape will undergo changes, 
urging researchers to describe and explain "new' alignments.
NOTES
1. Van der Eijk and NiemdUer quote Irwin and Dittrieh in this context: ‘Old bonds were 
loosened and not replaced ... For the moment no end seems in sight... Dutch elections may 
become even more unpredictable than they have been in recent years' (1987, 17).
2. Some authors suppose that religion has lost its relevance for voting altogether, as is implied 
by an elimination of this factor from theoretical considerations as well as empirical findings 
(Niemoller and Van der Eijk, 1986). However, in a later study they include religion in 
their model (Van der Eijk and Niemoller, 1987). Other authors state that the desirability 
of greater equality in society, associated with left-wing policies and serving working-class 
interests, has gradually lost its relevance (Van Deth and Geurts, 1989).
3. There is a substantial overlap between the political attitudes mentioned by Lipset and those 
mentioned by Middendorp (1991). Middendorp re-labelled economic liberalism as ‘econ­
omic left-right' and cultural conservatism as ‘authoritarianism-libertarianism\
4. Compare van der Eijk and Niemoller (1983, 1987). Niemoller and van der Eijk (1986), 
van Deth and Geurts (1989), Hendriks Vettehen (1990), and Schmeets and Molin (1992).
5. There are some references in the studies of Inglehart (1977, 1981) that mention the 
significance of a ‘New Class’ in which post-materialism was supposed to be rooted. But 
these references do not point to a certain social class as being strongly post-materialistic.
6 . Although the position of income is not very clear: in a 1987 study this variable appears to 
be non-significant (cf van der Eijk and Niemoller, 1987).
7. There is yet another argument to incorporate all of the factors affecting voting in a model. 
Middendorp. in his latest major contribution to this field (1991, 290), indicated the need 
for a more elaborate model including all relevant predictors to assess, for instance the 
effect of post-materialism as compared to other political attitudes.
8 . We have not specified causal relations between some of the intermediate variables, (i.e. 
between economic liberalism, cultural conservatism and post-materialism) because we 
found no strong arguments for such relations. These causally non-specified relations may 
induce incorrect results. Therefore we checked the partial correlations between these 
variables. As they appeared to be quite modest, we expect no serious disturbances from 
these non-specified relations.
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